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 Abstract 
 
The key question in this three way debate is the role of the collectivity and of agency.  
Collins and Shrager debate whether cognitive psychology has, like the sociology of 
knowledge, always taken the mind to extend beyond the individual.  They agree that 
irrespective of the history, socialization is key to understanding the mind and that this is 
compatible with Clark’s position; the novelty in Clark’s `extended mind’ position appears 
to be the role of the material rather than the role of other minds.  Collins and Clark debate 
the relationship between self, agency, and the human collectivity.  Collins argues that the 
Clark’s extended mind fails to stress the asymmetry of the relationship between the self 
and its material `scaffolding.’  Clark accepts that there is asymmetry but that an 
asymmetrical ensemble is sufficient to explain the self.  Collins says that we know too 
little about the material world to pursue such a model to the exclusion of other 
approaches including that both the collectivity and language have agency.  The 
collectivity must be kept in mind!1 
 
Keywords:  Cyborg, extended mind, interactional expertise, collectivity, language, 
cognitive psychology, self. 
                                                 
1 Though what follows is a robust exchange of views it is also a cooperative effort, 
authors communicating `backstage’ with each other to try to make the disagreements as 
clear and to the point as possible.   
 The Cruel Cognitive Psychology (by Harry Collins) 
The Cruel Sea2 
When I was a kid in the 1950s I was much moved by `The Cruel Sea,’ a film about 
Britain’s war against the U-boats.  Shot in black and white, it is about failure, frustration 
and futile waste of life.  A couple of years ago I watched it again and suddenly realized 
that more than about war it was about social class.  The newest recruit to the wardroom of 
the `Compass Rose’ immediately signifies his working class origins with loud and 
boorish mannerisms and enthusiasm for sausages, which he calls `snorkers.’  The rest of 
the officers speak quietly and disdain sausages.  When times get tough it is, of course, the 
loud snorker-lover who cracks while the quiet snorker-disdainers do their duty with stiff 
upper lips.  Why didn’t I notice this when I was a kid?  I was focused on the echo-
sounder, the depth charges, and the death of the innocent; I had neither the peripheral 
vision nor the right perspective for class analysis. 
 I believe that in five, ten, or, the way things are going, a hundred years, we are 
going to look back at Andy Clark’s (2003) book and say `why didn’t people see what it 
really meant?’  The book purports to be about our cognitive relationship with the physical 
world but I am going to suggest that its true meaning lies at its periphery.  It is its silences 
that speak about the curious state of modern cognitive psychology.  In the second part of 
these remarks I will try to bring nearer the day when we grasp this true meaning.   
 Let me start, however, by saying that I really enjoyed the book and learned a lot 
from it.  I like Clark’s self-indulgent but light-touch style which he pulls off about 98% 
of the time.3  I like his `extra large cat, Lolo,’ of which more later.  And I like a lot of the 
material which, to me as a sociologist, was new.  For example, there is a stunning card 
trick played out on pages 65 and 66 without needing cards which, since sense self-
indulgence is a theme here, I will say that I `got’ after an initial `expletive deleted’ and 
then about three seconds thought.  This fascinating section of the book is about how we 
                                                 
2 Evan Selinger helped me greatly with this exchange.  He pointed to things I should read, 
pointed out things I had missed in what I had read, and, occasionally, put right my 
interpretations of the things I had not missed. 
3 I think there is too much use of the unpleasant term `skinbag.’  
 pay attention only to that which is in focus and that, as indicated, is also going to be the 
central theme of the criticism that I will develop later.   
Brain flexibility and the body 
Central to Clark’s argument is the claim that the human brain is flexible enough to cope, 
in a natural way, with all kinds of extensions to its reach and powers.  Like Merleau-
Ponty’s description of a blind man’s relationship with his stick, we are equipped to 
develop prosthesis-like bondings with new things and associated media and this happens 
quickly and flexibly.  The flexibility argument is reinforced by descriptions of 
psychological experiments.  The experiment that I find `paradigmatic’ was carried out by 
a UCSD professor.  He got person `A’ to sit immediately behind person `B’.  A third 
party, C, then tapped B’s nose with A’s right hand while simultaneously tapping A’s nose 
with his, C’s, left hand.  A felt himself tapping a nose with his outstretched right hand 
while, with the same rhythm, he felt his own nose being tapped.  Apparently, after a 
minute or two, A felt that the tip of his own nose was coextensive with the position of the 
position of B’s nose – he had a two-foot long nose!   I can’t wait to try it.4  There follow 
several more descriptions of such experiments with equally fascinating results including 
the famous inverting eye-glass lenses.  It seems it does not take long to learn to ride a 
bike wearing glasses that invert the field of view.  By the end of all this I find myself 
convinced by Clark that my brain is as flexible as he says it is and that I should be ready 
to treat the new world of electronic prostheses as more of an opportunity than a threat.  I 
am going to try to change from being a natural-born curmudgeon to being an easy-going 
cyborg (with a few reservations of which more below).   
 Of course it may be that I am easily persuaded of these arguments because they 
could be seen to give at least a little support to some of mine.  I argue, contrary to the 
position of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Dreyfus, and various others, that there is a sphere 
of human life – namely fluent language speaking by individuals -- where the body has no 
importance and it is the brain that counts; this is the idea of `interactional expertise’ 
(Collins, 2004, Collins and Evans 2007; Collins et al 2007w).  Interactional expertise is 
                                                 
4 I have now tried it and, regrettably, it seems to need more perseverance than me and my 
colleagues could muster. 
 the ability to speak the language of a community fluently but the crucial point is that it 
can be done without being able to engage in the bodily activities of the community.  A 
person who engages in the bodily activities has `contributory expertise.’5  The claim is 
that it is possible in principle, and widely found in practice, that a person can have 
interactional expertise without contributory expertise.  The idea has wide application, 
though it initially arose out of a puzzle about the abilities of someone like myself, a 
sociologist of scientific knowledge.  I have spent decades immersed in a certain scientific 
community and have come to speak their technical language fairly fluently.   I have even 
passed a Turing-Test like examination of my ability to speak the technical language – that 
is, to speak fluently and creatively, not just parrot phrases.  But I have never done any 
experiments or written any papers pertaining to the science in question.  Thus, though I 
cannot `walk the walk,’ I can do more than just `talk the talk;’ I can, as it were, `walk the 
talk’ (or perhaps it is `talk the walk).6  What we in Cardiff call the `strong interactional 
hypothesis’ is that someone with maximal interactional expertise and no contributory 
expertise will be indistinguishable from someone with both kinds of expertise in any test 
based on language alone.  We have shown that this hypothesis is supported in the case of 
the colour-blind who can pass as colour-perceivers and in my own performance of the 
language of gravitational wave physics (Collins et al 2006; Collins and Evans 2007; 
Collins et al 2007w; Giles 2006).  The idea of interactional expertise also helps us make 
sense of the description given by Oliver Sacks of the abilities of `Madeleine,’ a blind and 
otherwise almost completely disabled person.  Sachs says she was a fluent speaker and 
could talk with verve about activities that she had never herself experienced (Sacks 
1985).7   
                                                 
5 If you have contributory expertise you probably have interactional expertise too but you 
at least have latent interactional expertise (you would have the ability to speak the 
language of the community if you were any good at speaking).   
6 So far as I know, and our experiments seem to reaffirm the point, this ability can be 
acquired only through immersion in the lived spoken life of the community.  It is not to 
be gained by any amount of reading or dense integration into the internet; fluent 
language-speaking is a tacit-knowledge laden activity. 
7 For a debate about the validity and implications of this position see Selinger, Dreyfus 
and Collins, 2008; Collins et al 2007w). 
  Following this line of argument it is possible to distinguish between the `social 
embodiment thesis’ and the `minimal embodiment thesis.’  The social embodiment thesis 
holds that the language of a human community is partly a function of the typical form of 
the bodies of its members – a kind of inward-looking Sapir-Whorf hypothesis:  just as 
those who are habitually surrounded by snow might be expected to have many words to 
describe it, those of us with an upright stance and whose knees bend backwards might be 
expected to talk of chairs as something to sit on when we want to relax.  In contrast, those 
who walk on all fours and are accustomed to being pushed around with whips and four 
pronged instruments might be expected to talk (if they could talk), of `chairs’ as sharp 
and unpleasant instruments of subjugation.  That is why Wittgenstein was right when he 
said, `if a lion could talk we would not understand what it said to us.’  On the other hand, 
you, as an individual, do not need legs to be able to speak fluently of chairs so long as 
you have been brought up in chair-speaking society.  If a (talking) lion had been snatched 
from its mother’s breast and brought up among us we would understand what it said to us 
because it would speak our language rather than `lionese’ in spite of its unsuitable body.  
That claim about the individual as opposed to the group is the minimal embodiment 
thesis.  It states that the bodily form of an individual has a minimal influence on the 
language the individual comes to speak because the language is determined by the 
embedding society.  Or, to put it another way (which is how it was first set out), an 
individual needs only a minimal body (ears, mouth, larynx, and maybe something else), 
to become fluent in the language of the surrounding society.  (Each way of describing the 
minimal embodiment thesis may be a corollary of the other.)  
 Clark’s brain-flexibility argument seems to lend a crumb of support to these 
theses for the following reasons.  If the `mind’ is flexible enough to get itself around any 
form of body then there is nothing special about the old-fashioned body as we currently 
know it.  If we all began tapping each others’ noses instead or our own the common 
language would soon begin to deal with the nose as something two feet in length.  Indeed, 
our language is changing all the time to take into account the new forms of relationship 
that the electronic frontier affords us and, on Clark’s argument, it could end up very 
distant from our current language.  This seems to accord with the social embodiment 
thesis. 
  More important, however, Clark’s position seems to give weak support to the 
minimal embodiment thesis just because it shows the brain is so flexible.  As Evan 
Selinger, with whom I have been arguing the point about the body (eg Selinger, Dreyfus 
and Collins, 2008), has pointed out to me, Clark’s position is interesting in that he does 
believe in the importance of the body as a driver of the mind but also believes that the 
mind is capable of dealing with an indefinite variety of bodily forms including virtual 
bodies.  You could say that if you stopped using your physical body and merely 
embedded the remnants of `yourself’ (your ears, larynx, and brain) in the language of a 
group of embodied others that would be a way of giving yourself a virtual version of their 
bodies.  Perhaps the minimal embodiment thesis is right because embedding a minimal 
body (ears, brain, larynx), in language is a way of extending it into a much more complex 
virtual body.  Maybe that is one way to describe what is happening in the experiments 
that support the strong interactional hypothesis.8  And if it is, then it follows that I could 
learn to speak `two-foot nose language’ even if I had no arms or nose so long as everyone 
else was speaking it.   
 Another reason I like Clark’s argument is that he is clear that the flexibility he 
talks about is a property of humans alone.  For example, Lolo, the extra large cat, does 
not have it.  Nevertheless, Clark `misses a trick’ when he discusses our interaction with 
machines and intellibots.  To be fair, many of the worries that arise from the treatment of 
elements of the physical world as extensions of our human selves are discussed in the 
section of the book entitled `Alienation’ which starts at page 177.  But there is a deeper 
point: Clark readily talks of `dovetailing’ -- extending our abilities in virtual networks, 
prostheses, and so forth, by fully engaging with them but he does not talk about 
dovetailing with Lolo.  A dovetail joint is a symmetrical joint: if you were to dovetail 
with Lolo, the Lolo would have to dovetail with you but Lolo can’t – Lolo’s brain does 
not have human-like flexibility.  To understand our role in networks we have to be 
                                                 
8 Theresa Schilhab (2008; Collins et al 2007w) even argues that some part of this ability 
might come from the operation of mirror-neurons during the watching of others’ bodily 
activities and Rodrigo Ribeiro (2008; Collins et al 2007w) also stresses the importance of 
watching activities for the generation of interactional expertise.  The case of Madeleine, 
on the other hand, seems to be a pure case of just listening and talking without any 
watching.   
 continually aware of the difference between symmetrical and asymmetrical links and talk 
very carefully about it.  When it comes to machines Clark’s talk is careless.  In his 
treatment, anthropomorphism is too easily mistaken for symmetry.  Yes, I can interact 
comfortably and `transparently’ with the extension of my brain on which I am writing 
this piece but it can’t interact comfortably with me; whenever something goes wrong in 
the interaction it is me who has to repair the problem (Collins 1997).  `Careless talk 
diminishes lives,’ as one might say.  There has been far too much careless talk around for 
the last four decades.  A language which treats an easy anthropomorphism as a 
symmetrical relationship encourages a colossal misunderstanding of the nature of the 
human; that is why it diminishes us.   
Looking back at cognitive psychology 
Now to what the book is `really’ telling us.  The main thesis is that the brain’s 
interactions with the world about us represents a natural extension of our cognitive 
powers – that is to say, we have never been isolated thinkers but were always supported 
by a cognitive scaffolding outside our physical selves.  As Clark likes to put it, as 
thinkers we are not confined to our `skinbag’ – to `skin and skull.’  As a sociologist, what 
I find odd about all this is that it is presented as something new -- `a discovery.’  But 
sociologists have always known it.  For example, the sociology of knowledge is generally 
introduced in year one of the undergraduate course or even earlier.  The sociology of 
knowledge is about how what we experience as sound knowledge varies as a function of 
where we are brought up and the different social forces to which we are exposed.9  You 
can’t have a sociology of knowledge unless people can be brought up differently and you 
can’t be brought up differently unless you can be brought up in the first place, and you 
can’t be brought up in the first place unless you are embedded in a wider society.  Being 
brought up is a matter of relationships with other people and other people are, as a first 
approximation, things outside yourself.  So things outside yourself determine your 
knowledge.  So it is completely obvious, at least to the sociologist of knowledge, that the 
                                                 
9 The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is the field in which I do most of my 
work.  It aims to show that scientific knowledge is not so different from ordinary 
knowledge as we once thought.   
 things we do with our brains have huge amounts to do with what is outside them as well 
as inside them. 
 How is it that the role in cognition of what is outside the brain counts as a 
revelation in cognitive psychology?  I can only suggest, following Clark, that it has to do 
with figure and ground.  Human individuals are about the same size as us and so are easy 
to see and think about.  What is more we all have a lot of experience of individuals – we 
are one.  Societies, on the other hand, are big, ethereal, invisible things.  On the pages of 
Clark’s book one can see the hard think-work that has been needed to move our vision 
from the central field of the individual brain just to the very near edge of the surrounding 
field.  The very effort and cleverness that is needed to show us that skin and skull are not 
a crucial boundary reveals the extent to which cognitive psychology has been 
concentrating so fixedly only on what is at the centre of its field of vision.   
 Now, lest this sounds like special pleading from a professional sociologist, and/or 
determined `socio-babbler,’ let us look briefly at one of the practical results of the failure 
to grasp the point that the individual cannot be thought about in the absence of the 
society.  One may read through, or sit through, any number of discussions of the promise 
of neural nets.  Neural nets are always on the point of becoming brain-like and, 
presumably intelligent.  Unfortunately, it never seems to occur to the writer/speaker of 
those expositions with which I am familiar that the individual brain is not the locus of 
intelligence.10  In so far as we live in a world of neural nets, the individual brain is just a 
small part of one of them.  The bit of the neural net that is found in the individual human 
brain has no significant boundary at the skull.  Andy Clark is right!  Consider language 
once more.  Any neural net that comprises human cognition extends at least as far as all 
the language users that the individual brain comes into contact with.  The material links 
within any one brain  (whatever `material’ means on a sub-microscopic scale), are just a 
bit of the net with links extending seamlessly to all the other brains, merely switching 
from `material’ mediation, to mediation by electromagnetic radiation, sound, smell and 
touch as the skull’s boundary is crossed.  Draw a neural net for language and the skull 
represents, at best, an inconsequential dotted line.  Any strengthening and weakening that 
                                                 
10 I understand the Clark has published on the topic of neural nets; he may be an 
exception.  I apologise for not knowing his particular work on this topic. 
 goes on in the links that exist inside your skull cannot be understood without 
understanding the strengthening and weakening of links between all the other neurons in 
everyone else’s head which are engaging with your neurons via any of your senses.  That 
is why I say that other people are outside ourselves only as a `first approximation;’ 
actually we are part of them.  An `intelligent’ neural net based on what is inside the skull 
will, at best, reproduce something like an autistic person, a feral child, or the inhabitant of 
a Skinner box who can learn no more than a pigeon.  Isn’t that just plain obvious?  How 
can we possibly build anything that resembles human intelligence unless it is part of the 
wider neural net – if it cannot be socialized?  Yet not one of the intelligent machines that 
have ever been actually built, or even conceived of, has the capacity to be socialized.  
The very best we have are machines that `learn’ through variable reinforcement of their 
output but not since Skinner has it been believed that this is how humans learn – Lolo 
maybe, but not humans.11  So all the talk we have had of intelligent machines is 
anthropomorphism and it is no surprise at all that no machine has ever come near passing 
even so simple a thing as the Turing Test in spite of the riches beyond the dreams of 
emperors that would follow from success.   
 None of this is to say that the restricted project of cognitive psychology as we find 
it is not difficult, fascinating and worthwhile.  If we could understand a pigeon, an 
autistic person, or a feral child to the point that we could model their behaviour in a 
computer it would be a remarkable achievement.  Carried away by my own rhetoric I 
may not have given due weight to the fact that the individual brain is a specially dense 
region of nodes and connections and, marvellously, is capable of storing the knowledge 
that is distributed in the wider net, at least for a while.  Sit a language speaker alone in a 
room and they can still speak the language at the end of the day pretty well as they spoke 
it at the beginning.  It is only in the long term that isolation degrades performance.  It is 
as though the human brain is a well insulated kettle – heat it up and it stays hot for quite a 
time.  Studying hot water is a pretty important thing to do but it must not be forgotten that 
studying hot water is not the same as studying energy.  It is the hype that passes off hot 
                                                 
11 Forgive me if there are pockets of cognitive psychologists who have reverted to a 
Skinner-like view; this critique comes from a sociologist and is very much painted with a 
broad brush. 
 water for energy that is the problem.  I suspect there may be cognitive psychologists who 
find that hype as irritating and dangerous as I do.12  Cognitive psychology is a great 
subject – this review indicates some of its more fascinating findings -- but in its current 
form it won’t provide what the boosters say it provides.  The intelligent machine is 
always just around the corner but we will never reach the corner while we think the 
individual is all there is to intelligence.   
 Echoes of this sociological critique can be found Clark’s argument, in particular 
that the human cognitive mechanism is not bounded by `skin and skull.’  But Clark, I am 
arguing, has merely grazed the surface.  What is needed, to coin the old cliché, is a gestalt 
switch.  Start to see knowledge as located not in the individual but in society.  To refer 
back to the nice card trick, cognitive psychology sees the Queen of Spades but what does 
`Queen of Spades’ mean without the rest of the deck and all the players?  The central 
topic of cognitive psychology – or least that part of cognitive psychology interested in 
modeling the mind by building working computer programs – should become the study 
of how the single skull-bound brain draws from the collective body of knowledge.  The 
goal of artificial intelligence should become to build a machine that can suck knowledge 
from the collectivity.  Admittedly such a machine would likely share many of the features 
of the human brain – and that is why cognitive psychology is doing great work -- but to 
imagine that building something with just those features and none of the sucking power is 
to miss the point.  We must invent the `culture sucker.’13  How far have we got?  COG!  
And yet every other week I read that intelligent robots are just about to take over the 
world! 
                                                 
12 Attending a public lecture by Stephen Hawking at the General Relatively 17 
conference, I found myself infuriated by the obscurity of his performance and the 
showmanship of he and his entourage, in which the mass media were complicit.  I found 
the lecture to be a religious event rather than a piece of physics.  Cornering some of my 
colleagues from gravitational wave physics I remonstrated with them `you see, your 
subject has its priests and its acolytes too.’  I was surprised to find that they were as angry 
as I was with what they had just witnessed. 
13 Oddly enough, the rhetoric of the expert systems boom of the mid-1980s pointed in the 
right direction though the conception of the problem was hopeless (Collins 1990; Collins 
and Kusch 1998).   As soon as one is tempted to make a claim about how a culture sucker 
might work one should ask: Could a child learn to be a grown-up in such a way? 
 Conclusion 
That’s it except for drawing out a few more points by way of summing up.  What Clark 
has done in an attractive and persuasive way is to show that our cognitive powers are not 
to be understood by looking only inside the skull.  He exemplifies his argument by 
revealing the power of the set of asymmetrical relationships we have with the physical 
world, though he himself does not seem to have noticed that they are asymmetrical.  That 
he has not noticed the asymmetry is illustrated by his impoverished model of language.  
For Clark, language is another set of scaffolding, serving the same function as the pencil 
and paper of the mathematician.  Words enable us to make thoughts into physical things 
that we can then work with in turn so that we can have thoughts about thoughts.  It is true 
that words can work like this but they do much more.  Clark does see this in an ill-
formed, peripheral vision, kind of way as the occasional, foot-shuffling, reference to 
`culture’ indicates.  To see the bigger picture look at how Clark uses language rather than 
at what he says about it.  To take just one example, look at the work done by Lolo, the 
extra large cat.14  Does Clark’s mention of Lolo mean only that he has a large cat in his 
house.  No, it means that Clark is (or likes to present himself as), a happy family man.  
This reading could not be carried off by someone who did not share a culture with Clark.  
I have to understand deeply the role of the domestic cat in British households and the 
conventions of academic writing to recognize just how much work is being done by Lolo 
without anything explicit being said.  And Clark, sharing the culture as he does, will 
understand why I can say with such confidence what extra-large Lolo is doing for his 
presentation of self and why no current of foreseeable `bot’ will `get it.’15   
 
                                                 
14 There is a lot more, not least about Clark’s intimate relations with his partner, but Lolo 
will do for our purposes. 
15 Barring retrospective `feeding by hand’ of each such specific piece of information after 
the fashion of a fixed `script’ – which is not how we learn.  (Sad that I felt compelled to 
write this footnote but experience suggests it is necessary.)  
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 The Blind Carpenter: A Reply to Harry Collins by Andy Clark 
 
In "The Cruel Cognitive Psychology" Harry Collins offers an engaging, (mostly) 
accurate, and profoundly challenging perspective on some central themes from my 
Natural-born Cyborgs. Among our points of agreement we count the rejection of what 
might loosely be termed body-chauvinistic accounts, according to which the precise 
details of individual embodiment place strong and immutable constraints on the kinds of 
knowledge and thought available the embodied agent. Here, Collins endorses what he 
dubs a Minimal Embodiment Thesis, which stresses the productive 'give' between the 
details of individual embodiment and the forms of thought and reason made available by 
the language practices that surround them: practices that may be centered on forms of 
embodiment not shared by every individual speaker. My own focus hereabouts has been 
on what I dub the constant negotiability of our embodiment itself, stressing the 
remarkable ease with which brains like ours learn to make the most of new opportunities 
provided by changing swathes of scaffolding and equipment, be it sensorily, brute-
physically, or even cognitively enabling. Crucial to the argument of Natural-born 
Cyborgs, then, was the claim that new layers of non-biological scaffolding (pens, papers, 
software packages and the like) might literally become incorporated into the very 
mechanisms of (some kinds of) human thought. The mechanisms of your own mind, I 
wanted to say, are not bound by skin and skull, nor fixed (though they will be 
constrained) by the wiring diagram of your individual brain. Minds like ours, if I am 
right, are chamelion hybrids: the emergent products of repeated rough and tumble 
mergers and coalitions resulting from the opportunistic exploitation of surrounding 
structures and opportunities. 
 
In describing these iterated mergers and coalitions, I spoke of processes of 'dovetailing' 
between neural processing and extra-neural resources. And it was here, Collins suggests, 
that I slipped gently but dramatically off the rails. For dovetails are in one sense 
symmetrical. Each side, it appears, has altered to interleave the other. Yet in our relations 
to those enabling swathes of non-biological scaffolding and support, the process of active 
interleaving looks distinctly lopsided. My pen and paper do not bend the better to 
 accommodate 'me'. Even my cat, Lolo, though in himself a remarkable piece of kit 
(sorry), lacks the full flexibility, in this regard, that characterizes the human participant. 
Asymmetry looms, and we ignore it, Collins fears, at our peril: 
 
"A dovetail joint is a symmetrical joint: if you were to dovetail with Lolo, the 
Lolo would have to dovetail with you but Lolo can’t – Lolo’s brain does not have 
human-like flexibility. To understand our role in networks we have to be 
continually aware of the difference between symmetrical and asymmetrical links 
and talk very carefully about it.  When it comes to machines Clark’s talk is 
careless.  In his treatment, anthropomorphism is too easily mistaken for 
symmetry.  Yes, I can interact comfortably and `transparently’ with the extension 
of my brain on which I am writing this piece but it can’t interact comfortably with 
me; whenever something goes wrong in the interaction it is me who has to repair 
the problem (Collins 1997).  `Careless talk diminishes lives,’ as one might say.  
There has been far too much careless talk around for the last four decades.  A 
language which treats an easy anthropomorphism as a symmetrical relationship 
encourages a colossal misunderstanding of the nature of the human; that is why it 
diminishes us."  Collins (this issue). 
 
I have quoted this at length because is comes so clearly from the heart, makes a point that 
is in one sense undoubtedly correct and immensely important, yet manages (nonetheless) 
subtly to miss the mark, at least as far as the argument of the book is concerned. 
Moreover, this issue lies at the root of much (misplaced) disquiet about the arguments 
concerning extended cognitive mechanisms (see, for example, some of the worries raised 
in Rupert (forthcoming)). 
 
To see where such worries go wrong, let's return to the image of the dovetailed joint. 
Notice immediately that both sides of the joint are deliberately carved to fit each other by 
a single agent, the carpenter. To whom or what in our story does the carpenter 
correspond? To no-one at all!  In suggesting the idea of a deliberate act of joinery, the 
image misleads. What we need (and what I had hoped the rest of text would conveniently 
 imply) is the blind carpenter, erstwhile compatriot of the blind watchmaker, and 
representative of the multiple and  multi-time-scale processes by which brains 
automatically adapt to socio-technological scaffoldings that themselves automatically 
adapt (by non-biological mechanisms of differential reproduction) to brains. Elements of 
deliberate design are clearly part of this process. But they do not exhaust it, and the 
designing itself is seldom done by the very same individual whose brain gets dovetailed 
to the product in question. 
 
 
Looked at in this light the asymmetries stressed by Collins, though real enough, can be 
seen not to threaten the actual argument. It is true that the key micro-locus of plasticity in 
all this is the individual human brain. It is the brain's great plasticity and thirst for cheap, 
outsourced labor that drives the distributed engines of socio-technological adaptation and 
change. It is true too, that subtract those meaty islands of wet organismic plasticity and 
the whole process grinds to a standstill. No new pens, paper and software packages when 
the human organisms all dry up and die. But it by no means follows, from the fact that 
those wet organismic islands are in that way lopsidedly essential to all this, that the rest 
of the hybrid, distributed circuitry is not part of the mechanistic base for specific episodes 
of cognitive processing. Similarly, as Dave Chalmers (personal communication) has 
recently pointed out, the activity of my visual cortex is not essential for my being the 
agent that I am. Were my visual cortex damaged, I would persist. Nonetheless, while up 
and running, it functions as part of the physical machinery upon which 'I' supervene. My 
relation to my own visual cortex is thus itself lopsided, but this in no way renders it false 
to speak of the visual cortex as helping to realize some of my mental activity.  
 
We should bear this kind of case in mind when Collins (see previously quoted passage) 
notes that when his interactions with props and tools go wrong it is 'he' who has to repair 
them. For the same may be said when aspects of our own bio-memory start to become 
unreliable and 'we' shift towards alternative means of storage and retrieval. Once again, 
the apparent lopsidedness (I have to take steps to offset the loss of bio-memory 
 functioning) does not threaten the claim that, prior to the loss, those bio-memory 
resources were realizing my cognitive activities. 
 
 
In general, the appearance of lopsideness arises, I suspect, largely because we are unused 
to thinking of our brains as themselves not a single indivisible unity ('me') but simply 
another collection of mechanisms upon which the agent currently supervenes. The agent 
is, to use a term from Hurley (1998), a kind of singularity that may be realized, at 
different times, by different coalitions of resources. 
 
If this seems a little murky that is because it is, in fact, extremely murky. But it is a good 
murk. It is the kind of murk we have to navigate, and soon, if we are to appreciate 
ourselves both as human agents and as shifting flows and eddies in the flux of mechanical 
cause and effect. What Collins does, with elegance and penetrating wit, is to push just 
hard enough at the story I tell to force it to reveal its true, though barely (if at all) 
realized, intent. For I think that we need to do more than simply embrace the profound 
role of socio-technological scaffolding in the construction of mind, thought and reason. 
To go that far may be simply, as one writer recently put it, to apply a "lexical band-aid" 
to "a 350 year old wound generated and kept suppurating by a schizoid metaphysics" 
(Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1999 p.275)). To really make progress we need to address the 
suppurating metaphysics itself. We need to go beyond the uneasy superposition of 
intuitive dualism and organismic-individualism that underwrites much present debate: to 
know ourselves in some way that does justice both to our experience of persisting agency 
and to its shifting and heterogeneous material base.  
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 The Cruel Harry Collins, by Jeff Shrager 
 
In his essay, “The Cruel Cognitive Psychology”, Harry Collins’ takes Andy Clark’s 
argument of brain flexibility in `Natural Born Cyborgs’ as evidence “there is a sphere of 
human life – namely fluent language speaking by individuals -- where the body has no 
importance and it is the brain that counts; this is the idea of ‘interactional expertise’”.  
Whether or not it pans out scientifically, this is a deep and important hypotheses, and I 
agree that Clark’s gathering of evidence lends support to it. That, declares Collins, is an 
interesting story that he finds barely submerged in Natural Born Cyborgs. But Collins 
dives even deeper to find what Clark is “really” telling us – the submarine story, so to 
speak – that “as thinkers we are not confined to our `skinbag’ – to `skin and skull.’” That 
that “things we do with our brains have huge amounts to do with what is outside them as 
well as inside them.” For sociologists of knowledge like Collins, this is of course 
mother’s milk. But Collins then spends the rest of his essay berating cognitive 
psychology for missing it: “Any neural net that comprises human cognition extends at 
least as far as all the language users that the  individual brain comes into contact with.” 16 
“How is it that the role in cognition of what is outside the brain counts as a revelation in 
cognitive psychology?”  
 
Collins is likely referring here to one of two general theories: Either he is (a) imagining 
that all our brains have to be somehow physically and in real-time connected up in order 
to anyone to think anything, or (b) imagining a temporally-extended analysis of cognition 
that reaches back to one’s infancy. Let’s leave aside the first of these as perhaps an 
appropriate discussion for another time, with more allotted space-time. As for the second 
theory, a historiologically-intensive analysis of the history of language and thought could 
be useful, although it would probably be hard to pull-off. (Where does it end? Do we 
need to go back to the obelisk that came down from Jupiter and gave the early hominids 
                                                 
16 Neural nets stand in for Collins throughout as the paradigmatic cognitive model; 
although I don’t think that they are in fact paradigmatic, I think that Collins would assert 
that his argument holds for whatever sort of model a cognitive psychologist would wish 
to offer, so I’m happy for the moment to let neural nets play this role. 
 their first words?) But, just as the importance of one’s culture on thought is old news to 
sociologists, it is old news as well to psychologists, and even older developmental 
psychologists than to Harry. For example, in the early part of the 20th century the Russian 
developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky developed a fundamentally socio-cultural 
theory of cognition wherein what he called “cultural mediation” and the “internalization 
of social speech” where considered fundamental aspects of the origins of cognition; and 
this set of theories is quite well respected by psychologists to this day.17 
 
Neither is it news to computational developmental psychologists18 that one’s cultural 
surround is critical to cognition. In fact, Clark’s book is based largely upon this premise: 
 
"Our distinctive mathematical prowess depends on a complex web of biological, 
cultural, and technological contributions. First. the biological brain commands an 
approximate sense of simple numerously. Second, specific cultures have coined 
and passed on specific number words and labels, including key innovations such 
as words for zero and infinity. Third, the cultural practice of enforcing simple 
rote-learning regimes (mathematical tables and so forth) added another element to 
the matrix. Finally. mix in the novel resource of pen and paper, and PRESTO! 
Our culturally enhanced biological brains can begin to tackle and solve ever-
more-complex problems, eventually scaling mathematical heights that our 
unaided biological brains (of our stripe) could never have hoped to conquer." 
 
And Clark didn’t just make this up, he cites numerous papers by cognitive psychologists, 
developmental psychologists, and computational developmental psychologists. Indeed,  
                                                 
17 Vygotsky’s ideas, and more generally the importance of inculcation in cognition, were 
reintroduced into the mainstream of developmental and cognitive psychology in the 
1980s by Werstch, and others (Wertsch, J. V. (1985). Vygotsky and the Social Formation 
of Mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London), and their 
importance is now widely discussed. 
18 I would probably be considered a “contributory” computational developmental 
psychologist, based upon Collins’ and Evans’s periodic table of expertise where a 
“contributory expert” can undertake an activity with competence.  Or, at least, I’ve 
managed to convince a few peer reviewers of my limited competence. 
  
Even deep connectionist brain modelers, working even before the ones cited by Clark, 
and whose work those later researchers based their work upon, understood the central 
role of culture in brain development:  
 
"The mammalian cortex is organized during development through a combination 
of endogenous and exogenous influences including genetic restructuring, 
subcortical influence, maturational timing, and the information structure of the 
organism's early environment.” [...] “The importance of the present theory with 
respect to the development of human cognition has not escaped our attention. One 
of the principle aspects of human development that distinguishes us from our 
nearest primate neighbors may be changes in the timing of development. Among 
primates, the human brain remains relatively plastic until late in the post-natal 
period, whereas the brains of our closest relatives are more completely formed by 
birth. Thus, humans have greater access to the complex experiences afforded by 
being out in the world during the most formative period of brain development. 
This may enable us to "tune in" to rapidly changing features of the environment 
that other animals, more constrained by evolutionary structuring of their brains, 
are unable to take account of. To the extent that these changes are reflected in 
similar timing changes in the hypothesized wave of cortical development, they 
may also lead to changes in the extraction of information from the stimulus 
environment during the early self-organization of the brain. Of course, along with 
this flexibility comes an extended period of immaturity, during which we are 
dependent upon our caretakers and our community for both support and training. 
Our theory therefore sees the coevolution of culture and cognition as a 
fundamental condition of human evolution.”19 (emphasis added) 
 
And as early as a decade before that, non-connectionist computational developmental 
psychologists were training their models with inputs whose statistical distribution 
                                                 
19 Shrager, J. & Johnson, M. H. (1996). Factors influencing the emergence of function in 
a simple cortical network. Neural Networks, 9(6), 1119-1129. 
 mirrored that observed in parent-child interactions. This practice has only grown in 
importance since that time, and the analysis of what the social environment provides the 
child, and of how the child uses that environment, have become increasingly 
sophisticated.  
 
So if Collins’ volley regarding the (non)revelation of the importance of the social in 
cognitive psychology is a shot across the wrong bow, at whom should he have been 
aiming? Collins gives us some hints, complaining that 'it hasn't worked' yet. (“How far 
have we got?  COG!”). Here I take it that the “it” he’s talking about is the program of 
building intelligent machines. Although cognitive psychologists aren’t trying to build 
intelligent machines, I’m happy to stand up in defense of AI engineers as well.20 Not 
having succeeded at something is not a very strong argument that its theoretical basis is 
wrong, just as our failure as yet to create a quantum computer is no indictment of  
quantum mechanics. And I haven't seen sociologists building artificial societies that work 
any better than AI folks’ poorly-working intelligent machines! Neither he nor we have 
HAL! So when Collins says “What is needed, to coin the old cliché, is a gestalt switch. 
Start to see knowledge as located not in the individual but in society.” it rings hollow; 
sociologists of knowledge say this a lot but I've never actually seen it cached out in a 
detailed analysis of a system (working or not), except to complain that this or that 
computer program (“COG!”) isn't "really" intelligent. Okay, I agree that COG isn’t HAL, 
but under what analysis isn’t this "real intelligence"? Maybe it's only the equivalent of a 
baby of  few months old. Is a baby "really" intelligent? A baby's brain is a whole lot more 
complex than anything we can build in any current computer, so it isn't too surprising that 
we don't even have "real" babies yet. Again, applied failure is a very weak argument 
against theory.21 
                                                 
20 I think that I would count as a “contributor” expert in some areas of AI as well, so I 
suppose it’s my duty to stand in their defense! 
21 And Collins' theory that "Human individuals are about the same size as us and so are 
easy to see and think about." seems an odd thing to say, esp. to a developmental 
psychologist; babies aren't “about the same size as us.” Do developmental (cognitive) 
psychologists somehow need less of a switch?  Are developmental (cognitive) 
  
Speaking of HAL, the super secretive, super intelligent computer in another Clarke’s 
(Arthur C. – spelled with an extra ‘e’) 2001, there is in Collins’ essay some evidence that 
who he’s really complaining about is science fiction writers, not cognitive psychologists. 
He complains: “And yet every other week I read that intelligent robots are just about to 
take over the world!?” Where? In science fiction thrillers about super secretive, super 
inlligent computers and apes getting language from ancient Jovian obelisks? And even 
“Arthur C-with an e” already knew what Collins claims to be somehow the mystical rite 
of sociologists; In the film adaptation of 2001, which appeared in 1968 – barely ten years 
after the birth of the modern computer! – there is a  brilliant scene where Dave Bowman 
turns HAL off by pulling out what are presumably parts of HAL’s neural net. As HAL 
looses his memory and begins to deteriorate, his speech slows and slurs and he reverts to 
his child-like self; who can forget HAL’s words, and especially the song: 
 
HAL: “I’m afraid” “I’m afraid, Dave” “Dave, my mind is going.” “I can feel it.” 
“I can feel it.” “My mind is going.” “There is no question about it.” “I can feel it.” 
“I can feel it.” “I can feel it.” (slowing speech) “I’m a...fraid.” (very slowly, as if a 
child, HAL ) “Good afternoon, gentlemen. I am a HAL 9000 computer. I became 
operational at the H.A.L. plant in Urbana, Illinois, on the 12th of January 1992. 
My instructor was Mr. Langley, and he taught me to sing a song. If you'd like to 
hear it, I can sing it for you.” 
 
Dave: “Yes, I'd like to hear it, Hal. Sing it for me.” 
 
Hal. “It's called...Daisy. (HAL’s speech slows progressively, eventually falling 
into silence) Daisy, Daisy, give me your answer do. I'm half crazy, all for the love 
of you. It won't be a stylish marriage, I can't afford a carriage, but you'll look 
sweet upon the seat of a bicycle built for two..." 
                                                                                                                                                 
psychologists not really cognitive psychologists because we (developmentalists) study 
how babies learn to be humans through (among other things) cultural embedding? 
 
  
So, apparently Harry and I, and both Andy and Arthur C. Clark(e) – sociologists, 
psychologists, and even science fiction writers – agree that interaction with one's culture 
is a critical substrate for cognition. Studying cognition, or building AIs, (or writing 
science fiction stories) does not, so far as I can tell, in any way exclude cultural 
embedding. Far from needing gestalt switches, all that we psychologists claim is that the 
thing inside our skin-and-skull, no matter how you analyze it, is a pretty interesting 
machine. We just want to know in how it works. And Collins does too! 
 
 Symmetry and Socialisation: Reply to Clark and Shrager by Harry Collins 
 
I enjoyed Andy Clark’s elegant response to my criticism of his Natural-Born Cyborgs but 
I could not understand all of it.  For example, I do not see why the invocation of a blind 
carpenter making the dovetail joints makes any difference.  I was never in any doubt 
about the work done by the blind carpenter but I can’t see why this renders the relative 
roles of human agents and material scaffolding any less asymmetrical.  I do see the 
interest in the remark that the asymmetrical relationship involves a somewhat murky 
agent who has an equally asymmetrical relationship with the physical constituents of his 
or her own brain.  I also see still more clearly that, therefore, this murky agent, can be 
physically constituted out of a various different collections of bits and pieces and, still be 
what it is – something like soup.  I like the point especially since it allows me to replace 
much of the `long pig’ with linguistic fluency and still have a nourishing agency broth.   
 
It also seems true to me that we may need a new metaphysics to deal with the agent but I 
do not think the problem with the metaphysics is what most people think it is.  It seems to 
me that for the last few decades I keep hearing complaints about dualism and the problem 
with our metaphysics being its sharp divide between the material and the human, or some 
such.  Indeed the words `false dualism’ seems to have achieved the status of a kind of 
`mantra,’ whose very utterance is capable of bringing an end to debate.  As far as I know, 
however, one of the conditions that must be satisfied by a metaphysics is not to be at 
variance with the physics supported by it.  In this case the physics is the asymmetry 
between the murky human agent and the material: the fact of this dualism smacks us in 
the face every day.  It is not, then, false dualism that is the problem but unexplained 
dualism.  We need a metaphysics of murky agents but it will not succeed by wishing 
away the distinction between human agency and the material.  This is not the place to go 
into the arguments, but I am sure the new metaphysics must start by exploring the 
peculiar nature of the social relations that tie the murky agents together and give them 
their qualities.   
 
 On the matter of cognitive psychology, it looks like I owe apologies all round.  This 
whole interchange has been a learning experience for me.  In truth, I have never been 
quite sure what cognitive psychology is but if it is what Jeff Shrager says it is then my 
future (if I have one) lies in cooperation with cognitive psychologists not conflict with 
them.  An apology to Andy Clark is needed because I did not point out, as Shrager does, 
that his remarks about the sources of his own argument show that he too is well aware of 
other sources for the idea of the extended mind. 
 
It looks like what I have been doing is some poor sociology of academic disciplines.  I 
am still puzzled by the `revelatory’ tone in respect of Clark’s claims about the way the 
mind extends itself beyond skin and skull in respect of material artifacts since his very 
own work, I now realize, reveals that for a very long time various kinds of psychologist 
have known that the brain reaches out all over the place.  So I am going to pass just a bit 
of the blame to Clark.  Nevertheless, what I have been doing is reading far too much into 
some rhetorical flourishes – I was just taking it that Clark’s way of presenting his ideas 
implied that the idea that the brain was not `on its own’ was news to lots of people 
(sociologists apart) whereas I should have seen from the book itself that it was not news 
at all except in respect of the material dimension of what is outside the skull.   
 
Now, in the last paragraph I say `sociologists apart’ but those two little words again 
exemplify bad sociology.  In fact, over the last two decades, the majority of sociologists 
who work in `my neck of the woods,’ if it is still my neck of the woods, have worked 
with views far more sympathetic to Clark’s way of seeing the world than to my way.  
Astonishingly, sociologists of science, such as that very large numbers who align 
themselves with Bruno Latour’s ideas, allow for no ontological distinction between the 
human and the material.22  My charge to Clark that he misses the asymmetry of the 
relationship between the agent and the entities from which the agent is composed, would 
apply equally to this group and they would find his complaint about suppurating 
metaphysics exactly to their taste – indeed, they could have made it themselves.  In future 
                                                 
22 A critique of Latour’s work along these lines can be found in Collins and Yearley, 
1992. 
 I will try to heed the warning that talking of this or that kind of `ists’ (psychologists, 
sociologists, computer scientists), is likely to conflate a lot of diverse opinions.   
 
I can’t resist responding to Jeff Shrager’s volley of quotes with one originating from his 
own university.  The Stanford News for April 20 2006 reports that a so-called `singularity 
summit will be held on the campus.  It goes on to explain: 
 
"The Singularity will be a future period during which the pace of technological 
change will be so rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly 
transformed," said Ray Kurzweil, keynote speaker and author of the best-selling 
The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (Viking, 2005). 
"Based on models of technology development that I've used to forecast 
technological change successfully for more than 25 years, I believe computers 
will pass the Turing Test by 2029, and by the 2040s our civilization will be 
billions of times more intelligent." 
 
I know Jeff is going to say that Kurzweil is more of a science fiction writer than anything 
else but why cannot we cognitive psychologists and sociologists shut these people up.  
There are many more of them, as a bit of Googling will show, not least the same Kevin 
Warwick who is discussed by Clark in his book.  Why can’t we make the idea that the 
human is essentially a social animal so salient that it becomes impossible to put forward 
these outrageous claims without adding `so long as we solve the problem of 
socialization.’  And COG remains relevant for the same reason.  Here is Rodney Brooks, 
one of the most successful figures in the AI world, working at what is probably the 
world’s leading AI laboratory, building something one step beyond a talking doll and 
calling it socialization.  It brings to mind the Pacific Islanders and their quest for `Cargo.’  
In May 1994 I gave a paper to a major British cognitive science department with a strong 
reputation in AI research in which I argued for the centrality of socialization to the 
problem of machine intelligence.  I was told that I should go and look at COG.  When I 
said that I knew enough about COG to know that looking at it was a waste of time it was 
intimated that I was some kind of Luddite.  Surely this really does indicate that someone 
 is not doing their job, be it the AI community itself or the people with which it speaks, 
including ourselves.  Or maybe I am doing bad sociology again, I’ve certainly been 
shouting my head off for a long time without making any impact and maybe everyone 
else is shouting too.  What we do know is how hard it is to change the minds of a group 
of academics which is doing well in terms of money and/or public recognition. 
 
Sociologists and psychologists are `natural born enemies’ because they are born fighting 
over the same terrain.  Most of my fights with psychologists have been exactly about the 
topic under discussion here – the extent to which you can make sense of individuals 
without seeing them as essentially part of some murky metaphysical thing called the 
social collectivity.  Not to lose the frisson entirely let me say that there is more to the 
collectivity than Shrager’s `initial upbringing.’  There is also the deeper point that no new 
concept makes sense until it comes to belong to the collectivity.  That is the difference 
between the scientific genius and the crank, the daub and the avantgarde masterpiece, the 
leader and the blunderer.  Our conceptual life cannot be understood in the absence of the 
collectivity.  This is not to say that if you lock me up in a room isolated from my 
community in the morning I won’t any longer be an English speaker by the end of the 
afternoon.  But I won’t have contributed to the adding of anything new to the English 
language in that time and if you lock me up for a lot longer, when I get back to society I 
will find that English is no longer what it was when I left it.23    
 That said, there are few finer experiences in academic life than to find that some 
group from which you have felt separated because of tribal allegiances are really thinking 
along the same lines.  I just hope that we can all be a bit more vocal in the future about 
pointing out that socialization is one of the central problems of AI -- I think it is the 
central problem -- and that no computer will act intelligent until we have learned how to 
bring it up like a baby, and make it to interact with those around it like an adult.  And 
interacting with those around it like an adult means putting as much into the relationship 
as it takes out.  I don’t care if cognitive scientists and computer scientists don’t know 
                                                 
23 For more on the `episodic’ nature of social embedding see, for example, Kusch 2002, 
p177  
 how to begin this project, only that they see that it is a problem that must be solved if real 
progress is to be made in either understanding or reproducing human thought and action.   
 
 Individual and collective, by Jeff Shrager  
Collins claims (above), "...no computer will act intelligent until we have learned how to 
bring it up like a baby, and make it interact with those around it like an adult. And 
interacting with those around it like an adult means putting as much into the relationship 
as it takes out." 
 
Given this sentiment, I think that we (or, at least Harry and I) are now in complete 
agreement and there is no need for a further response from me!  (EMS) 
  
 Agents and asymmetry, by Andy Clark 
 
Collins certainly makes you think. His reply is typically elegant, forceful and truthful (a 
word I'd seldom use in academic context, but that seems apt in this instance). 
 
 I guess the point for me is that I don't want to deny the asymmetries Collins (very 
properly) highlights. The point is murkier than that. I want to allow the agents themselves 
to be constituted by collections of elements whose internal relations may indeed be 
asymmetric. In that way, the physics and the metaphysics would still fit together, as 
Collins rightly insists they must. To take a mundane case, my index finger and I have just 
such an asymmetric relation: I can persist without it but it cannot persist without me. I 
can help repair it (with a plaster) but it (working alone, as it were) can never repair 
me...etc, etc. 
 
My claim is that once we look to the parts rather than the whole, it is "fingers all the way 
down": that where cognition and mind are concerned, we murky agents do not even 
cleanly stop where we find the bounds of skin and skull. I suspect this is something 
Collins might even agree with, while still laying more stress on the asymmetries than I 
do. In a sense, our relationship with language (not with the agents who produce it, but 
with language considered as a mass of vibrations, inscriptions etc) is also 
asymmetric...but that doesn't seem to preclude its laying a key cognitive role in his own 
model. Does this help clarify the issues at all?  
  
Squarks and language, by Harry Collins 
I’m still learning.  I now see more clearly than ever before that the brain, as we know it, 
which I have always vaguely thought of as something special, is not much different from 
the lead in the mathematician’s pencil: brain substance, as we know it, may have special 
properties but only in the way that the lead has the property of making marks on paper.  
Nevertheless, I still do not understand the determination on the part of Clark and so many 
others to eliminate the unexplained part of the self (which is to say that my understanding 
is in terms of intellectual fashion rather than ineluctable logic.)  Assuming `constituted’ 
has an ontological force to it I don’t see why Clark “want[s] to allow the agents 
themselves to be constituted by collections of elements.”    
 As far as I can see the asymmetry that we agree exists between the agent and its 
currently palpable elements leaves the agent with a special role.  I confess that I have 
difficulty with the idea that the special role is simply something that `emerges’ from the 
way the palpable elements are assembled but maybe that’s my problem and I should 
simply think harder.  But how hard should I think?  Maybe one can think too hard!  Even 
if the spirit of scientific investigation abjures the invocation of a soul or its equivalent we 
still know very little of the material constituents of the universe so why should I be 
determined to explain everything in terms of our current notion of the material elements?  
To base one’s understanding of the human agent on the notion that there is nothing more 
to know about its material constituents than pencils, muscles, and molecules may well 
place too great a burden on the couple of seconds science that complete the metaphorical 
year of human history.  Even as I write, physicists are arguing about the relationship 
between consciousness and quantum uncertainty (those darned cats taking center stage as 
usual).  [AC writes:Regarding pencils, muscles and molecules, it is the functional roles 
they play that matter, so it is not as staunchly physical-reductionist a project as this makes 
it sound.  HMC responds: maybe that leaves a role for squarks – see below] 
 Let me hypothesise, then, that the self is a material thing but it is not made out of 
the elements of brain substance as we know it, even with the addition of arms, legs, 
bodies, pencil, papers and screwdrivers, but is part of an `11-dimensional, quantum-
entangled, tachyonic, dark energy driven, ensemble of chaotic wormholes,’ which I’ll call 
 a `squark.’24  Incidentally, one of the things about a squark is that it links all human 
minds together via quantum entanglement and wormholes so that when we think we are 
speaking for ourselves we are merely participating in the wholeness of the extended mind 
of humankind, being particularly strongly connected to those who speak the same natural 
language.  It would be presumptuous to call this a new material property of the brain 
because that would be to assign a physical location to it that may or may not be 
appropriate (and hence the references to `the brain as we know it’).  A squark, in case it 
isn’t obvious, is not something that I really want to posit – I am not, as many physicists 
do, demanding a paradigm shift in physics in the face of the intractable problems of the 
measurement problem in quantum theory, mind over matter (moving my little finger, the 
placebo effect), and so forth.  I am not a physicist.  A squark is simply a place-holder for 
all the stuff we don’t know about, the current impenetrability of which becomes evident 
even to non-physicists if you hang around physicists long enough or just read the New 
Scientist.   
 What kind of thing is a squark (and the things it holds a place for)?  Dennett 
(1992) makes the useful distinction between abstract objects, such as the concept of 
`centre of gravity’ -- something useful for doing calculations but merely as an analytic 
consequence of our way of thinking about mass – and inferred entities, such as (at one 
time), the atom.  You cannot see a centre of gravity because it is only a calculative 
convenience; you cannot (could not) see an atom but that was no reason not to treat it as 
real.  You also cannot see a squark, but that is not because it is an abstract idea like a 
centre of gravity, it is because our science and technology is so primitive.  All we know 
about it is what we can infer from a few of its effects on our lives (the day-to-physics of 
life that must be reconciled with the metaphysics).  A squark is not like a centre of 
gravity, then, but like gravity itself – something that Newton thought up to explain what 
he saw happening around him even though he could not touch it, see it, or smell it and, 
                                                 
24 Dennett (1992) writes: `Brain research may permit us to make some more fine-grained 
localizations, but the capacity to achieve some fine-grained localization does not give one 
grounds for supposing that the process of localization can continue indefinitely and that 
the day will finally come when we can say, "That cell there, right in the middle of 
hippocampus (or wherever)--that's the self!"’  But why that cell?  Why not that squark?  
 worse, it seemed to be `action at a distance.’  Yet gravity is now enshrined as one of the 
four basic forces and a squark has this potential. 
 Squarks, of course, may not turn out to be the key to all this stuff happening 
around us.  It may turn out to be quarks, or querps.  Or it may turn out that, as Dennett 
and Clark argue, there is nothing extra needed.  Or it might turn out to be an emergent 
property of the material world we know but it emerges at the level of collectivities of 
brains, the linking medium not being quantum entanglement, wormholes, or anything like 
that, but just sound, sight, touch, and smell (as argued earlier, once you start assembling 
things into an ensemble there is no reason to stop at individual brains).  It might be any of 
these – it is just that we don’t know for sure).  [AC writes: I am not opposed to 
squarkiness, just don't yet see any compelling reason to start looking out there for the 
nature of mind. Are we going this way just because the other story seems so hard to 
swallow? Squarkiness is pretty indigestible too!  HMC responds: One doesn’t have to 
digest squarks per se, just the idea that there is lot out there we still don’t understand.  But 
we don’t want to swallow too hard on what we do understand.] 
 Is the attribution of squarkyness to the brain a reinvention of the `Cartesian 
Theatre in a thin disguise?  The squark idea does indeed imply some as yet unknown 
properties of agency that `lie behind' what we can currently see happening in the brain 
and may well give it direction and its unique ability to `repair' broken bits of the things it 
interacts with but it does more than fill a logical lacuna, it might one day be talked of like 
atoms or gravity.  Asquark is certainly not a homunculus -- it is material stuff quite 
different to a little human.  It does not seem to me that one can ban all new discoveries 
about how agency might work by intoning `Cartesian Theatre' any more than intoning 
`heretic.’   
 Another thing that a squark is not like is `the dormative property of opium’ -- as 
in, `opium makes you sleep because it has a dormative property.’  A squark is not a 
definition in terms but something that might or might not turn out to be real.  Finally, the 
squark hypothesis is not like, say, the soul, or the intelligent design hypothesis.  Both of 
those hypotheses come from the domain of religion rather than science and both are 
damaging to science because they put an end to scientific inquiry: they say, for example, 
`don’t search any further for the causes of the development of this organ it was a matter 
 of intelligent design,’ or don’t search any further for an explanation of the asymmetrical 
relationship between the human agent and the pencil, it is a matter of the soul.’  The 
squark hypothesis says `keep on searching – agency may be a matter of squarks, or 
maybe not, and one day we might find out.’   
 Oddly, the position taken by Dennett and, perhaps, Clark, seems to bear more of a 
relationship with the intelligent design idea, or the idea of the soul, than it does with the 
squark hypothesis.  This is because it implies: `Don’t search any further, we know the 
answer already.’  It implies: `Everything you need to know about agency, the self, etc. is 
already there in the material world as we know it.’  It demands: `Just assemble the 
already known elements and nothing more.’  It is, in short, something like a religion of 
the material world as we know it now.  Of course, it is not a religion in the sense of 
invoking a realm of the spiritual as opposed to the material but it is like a religion in the 
way it sets boundaries to inquiry in a priori way, bans certain kinds of thought, and 
discourages heresy with accusations such as `false dichotomy!’  In the face of the-
material-world-as-we-know-it religion, I want to insist that there may be squarky stuff 
out there.  [AC writes: I would categorically deny that there is any a priori boundary 
setting going on…I just await good reason to go looking among the squarks, and also, 
some  sound methodology for doing so (either of these would justify some explorations,)  
HMC responds: I can’t supply the methodology but I think I can supply the good reasons 
–  asymmetry and collectivities.  Kuhn’s term `anomaly’ may be germane here.  Kuhn 
uses the term to mean two things: anomalies(1) are irritations inconsistencies that one 
should brush over, or leave to the future, if one wants to get on with things; anomalies(2) 
are obstinate problems that indicate that there is something wrong with one’s current 
view of the world.  I am trying to raise the status of `asymmetry’ and `role of the 
collectivity’ from the anomaly(1), which is what they are at best in the Dennett/Clark 
world view, to anomaly(2).] 
 What the religion has in its favour is the useful rule not to multiply entities 
beyond what is necessary.  Nevertheless, we must always bear in mind the counter-
aphorism, seemingly a paraphrase of Einstein: `Theories should be as simple as possible 
but no simpler.’  Were it not that the everyday physics keeps slapping us in the face – 
were there are everyday phenomena that one can only reconcile with the material world 
 as we know it by arguing like a zealot – then the squark hypothesis would not have a 
chance.  As it is, however, it seems more than likely that we do need something extra.25  
The real danger is that the zeal for parsimony – thinking too hard -- causes us to ignore 
phenomena that do not fit the doctrine, such as the power of the collective on our lives 
and the asymmetry of the whole and the parts [anomaly(1) and anomaly(2) HMC.].  The 
danger, to revert to the psychology of perception motif, is that these things are 
determinedly or unconsciously relegated to the periphery when they should be  in focus. 
 Clark’s final remark about language makes me realize that I have been making 
mistakes again.  I have been far too lax in talking about language as a prosthesis, 
`replacement for the long pig,’ and so forth.  Language, according to my account, is itself 
something that belongs in the realm of agency – the agency of the collective.  Unlike 
brain substance as we know it and pencils, it’s a bit squarky.  Language is not just a tool, 
like a hammer, the asymmetry of whose relationship to the agent allows it to be replaced 
by a heavy stone.  You can’t replace language with something else that would do the 
same job because the language is integral with the life of the collective agent (as 
manifested in interactional expertise).  [AC writes: I don't quite see this…though I do 
agree that anything that would do that very job would count as some kind of 
language…is that the idea?  HMC responds: Well, we might be able to replace language 
with something else `with language-like properties,’ but I cannot imagine what it might 
be like.  That is to say, it would be more like a squark than a stone.]   
 Language, then, is on the wrong side of the asymmetry relationship to be a 
prosthesis.  Language is not part of a virtual body, but it can be a creator of virtual 
bodies.  The form of the virtual bodies it may create is determined by the collectivity’s 
(not the individual’s) interactions with the world.  As I have learned from this exchange, 
`the world’ referred to here includes the body and the material objects with which it 
interacts.  As Clark points out, there is enough flexibility for this language to respond to 
radically changed material circumstances. 
                                                 
25 I am not the only one to believe this – see,  for example, various works on the mind by 
physicist, Roger Penrose.  A well-know principle in sociology of scientific knowledge 
can be summed up by the phrase: `distance lends enchantment.’  Physicists inhabit a far 
more mysterious physical world than those distant from physics. 
  What we need, and forgive me for banging on, is to find out how the individual 
agents interact with the collective agent.  We do need to `keep the collectivity in mind.’  
It may be that we already know enough to work this out, given enough zeal or it may be 
that there is more to be discovered.   
References 
Dennett, Daniel C. (1992) The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity. In: F. Kessel, P. 
Cole and D. Johnson (eds.) Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
 
Kusch, Martin, (2002), Knowledge by Agreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
